



UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL



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CHAIRS? WHO?

Dear Delegates,

We are delighted to welcome you to the Security Council at A'MUN 2025. This conference will provide an excellent platform for delegates to discuss and address pressing global issues. We understand that some of you may be participating in an MUN conference for the first time, and we wish you all the best. We know that being a first-time delegate can be daunting, from preparing position papers (or op-eds, in our case - more on that in the training session) and researching your ministers foreign policy and allies, to practicing your opening speech. However, we want to assure you that we are here to support and guide you every step of the way. Regardless of your level of experience, we have no doubt that you will give in your best effort during the conference. We want to remind you that the main aim of any MUN conference is to have fun and make the most of your experience over the weekend at A'MUN. As the bicameral Dias of the Security Council, we have prepared a Background Guide to provide you with a basic overview of the topics that will be discussed during the conference. We hope this guide will be a good starting point for your research, however we do expect delegates to conduct more in-depth research on their own that align with the data pertaining to the country you represent.

If you have any queries or doubts, please do not hesitate to contact us. We are always available and ready to assist you to the best of our abilities. We look forward to an enriching, fruitful and enlightening experience from all you delegates, and we wish you the best of luck!

Warm Regards, The Executive Board of the Security Council,

Moksha J

Syesha Fidvi

Ian Lobo

Dias of UNSC



CHAIRS? WHO?



Moksha Jain
Head Chair



Ian Lobo
Co Chair



Sysha Fidvi
Co Chair



WHAT IS UNSC?

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The United Nations Security Council primarily holds the responsibility towards maintaining international peace and stability. It performs its functions through a primary body of 15 members, with each member holding 1 vote on all procedural matters. Substantive matters, such as an investigation of a dispute or the application of sanctions require 9 affirmative votes. These 9 votes are inclusive of the 5 permanent members of the UNSC who hold veto power. The 5 members who have this power in the UNSC are China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They have the ability to cast a negative vote (veto), and when this vote is cast, the resolution would be tabled after all the permanent members of the committee and the chair discuss the terms of the veto. However, this should be followed by a sufficient speech by the delegate on why they chose to fail the resolution, otherwise it is not considered valid. It is important to note that this has been exercised by each member, with Russia using veto the most at 128 times. The other 10 non-permanent members of the UNSC are selected by the General Assembly for a two year period and are selected on a regional basis.

The Security Council, being responsible for the maintenance of international peace, has the key role in determining how a threat to international peace should be handled. The members can classify it as an act of aggression, which would follow either settling it by peaceful means and recommending methods of adjustment or terms of settlement, or going further and imposing sanctions on the aggressor or even military action. Considering the multifaceted role of the UNSC, the delegates should be well equipped and understand the true dexterity of the agenda at hand before moving into passing a resolution, since any decision made by the UNSC is binding for all UN member states. Bearing in mind the integral role of the UNSC towards stabilizing and maintaining peace throughout the world, it also has other subsidiary bodies which it works in unison with, which focuses on specific agendas like counter-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation or peacekeeping operations. Considering the nature of the United Nations Security Council, there is a requirement of each of its members to be present at all times at UN Headquarters so that the Security Council can meet at any time as the need arises. The UNSC does not follow an annual meeting like the General Assemblies, but is required to function continuously. For example, when a threat to international security is posed, the UNSC would be required to assemble immediately.

Thus, as delegates of the UNSC you would need to generate resolutions which would swiftly but meticulously solve the agenda at hand



AGENDA 1 & 2

1. The Role of NATO in Eastern Europe: Provocation or Protection?

2. Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Technology to Non-State Actors



AGENDA 1

NATO, also known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was set up in order to block the Soviet Union expansion in Europe in 1949 during the height of the Cold War. A significant facet of NATO is its collective security. If one of the 32 members is attacked, the others are obliged to help defend it. Due to this, NATO does not have an army of its own, but member states can take collective military action.

NATO's military presence in the eastern part of Europe has been heavily established in recent years. NATO has sent more ships, planes and troops as a testament towards the Allies resolve and readiness to defend Alliance territory and populations. This has been in order since the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, wherein the Allied Heads of State and Government agreed to establish a greater presence in both the northeast and southwest regions of the Alliance. In 2017, NATO deployed four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland which were led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the USA.

The reasons for this forward military presence is because of Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia acts as a threat towards the allies security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and in order to maintain the peace within the Alliance, along with the pre-existing four battlegroups, the Allies established four more in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, doubling the number of troops on the ground, specifically in regions bordering Eastern Europe. To add on, at the 2022 Madrid Summit, the Allies committed to deploying additional forces on the east and aimed to scale up the multinational battlegroups 'where and when required'.

The European Union, with 23 members in common with NATO, has been viewed as a 'unique and essential partner for NATO', with both of them condemning Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. With both the European Union and NATO condemning Russia's aggression, a clear conflict of interest between NATO allies and Eastern Europe can be seen.

In order to understand the Russian aggression which has caused NATO to scale their military so grandly, the nature of Russian regimes needs to be taken into consideration.



AGENDA 1

Ukraine has always been a weak military link to Russia and the invasion was primarily based on a desire to control Ukraine and reestablish Russian control over former Soviet territories and prevent Ukraine's integration with the west in general. NATO's role in the conflict is due to Russia's fear of NATO enlargement, which would inherently challenge Russia's security interests and inflame Russian nationalism. It would also impact Russia's plans of expansion into former Soviet territories. They considered Ukraine as a 'red line'. The invasion can be seen as a response to NATO's refusal to rule out further expansion, particularly regarding Ukraine's potential membership. Boris Yeltsin, a Russian statesman is quoted as saying that NATO enlargement would be 'nothing but humiliation for Russia.'

It is also important to note that the United States makes up 2/3rds of NATO's defense expenditure of the Alliance as a whole, and an army primarily run by the United States near Eastern Europe could've been a stem for Russian Aggression. Additionally affirmations throughout 2021 by U.S. officials that Washington supported Ukraine membership in NATO amid the Biden administration's broader push to revitalize U.S. alliances.

But, NATO has also tried to ally with Russia by developing dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. Despite this, Russia has continuously violated the terms of NATO's envisionment for a stable Europe and has increasingly disrupted peace and stability within Europe, which is why NATO has decided to no longer consider Russia as a partner. Additionally, Ukraine was neutral before Russia invaded in 2014 and 2022, with the majority of Ukrainians even opposing joining NATO before the 2014 Russian invasion. Thus, the response of NATO and their avid militarization can be refuted since the invasion was not directly affecting any NATO Alliance, since Ukraine only requested for accelerated membership following the renewed aggression from Russia.

However, The Kremlin believes that NATO has violated their promise to not expand eastward and views the expansion as a direct threat to its national security. The Alliance's increased military presence is not taken as a defensive measure in Russia's eyes, but rather provocative and potentially hostile. This, combined with the influence of the west on NATO's collective military has rubbed salt into the wound of Russian Aggression.



AGENDA 1

China has also refused to condemn Moscow's invasion of Ukraine. When NATO members expressed concern about China becoming a definitive enabler in the Russian conflict, due to their ties in terms of trade and diplomacy, a Chinese spokesperson called out NATO for attempting to 'provoke confrontation and rivalry'. Though China has officially remained a neutral party in the conflict, they are a major stakeholder considering their close diplomatic ties with Russia.

In addition, NATO has also proven to be not purely defensive in the past. Its intervention in Kosovo was not mandated by the UNSC and was seen as primarily due to geopolitical interests to limit Russian influence in the Balkans. Similarly, in Libya, the intervention by NATO caused prolonged instability, even though Libya never posed a direct threat to NATO. This raises the question on whether NATO's current actions stem from defense or personal interests of the Allies.

The United Nations along with NATO, has not stayed silent in the face of the recent Russian adversity. The UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions which condemn Russia's aggression and demands the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine and has even established an independent international commission, in which its primary goal is to investigate war crimes. Other bodies of the UN, like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ordered Russia to suspend military operations in Ukraine and the UNHRC has also called for a "swift and verifiable" withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine.

Because of the United Nations taking action against Russia, NATO's additional defense and strategy to protect themselves from Russia can be seen as futile, since another international organization, one in which Russia is a member, is taking action towards mitigating the crisis at hand.

Currently, NATO remains willing to maintain channels of communication with Moscow to mitigate risks involving the ongoing conflict in Eastern Europe in light of protecting Ukraine and its sovereignty. The question on whether NATO's measures, though defensive in intent, might escalate the conflict or be seen as challenging Russia's sphere of influence.





BACKGROUND 1

The agenda at hand (The Role of NATO in Eastern Europe: Provocation or Protection?) emphasizes on both NATO's side on why they are increasing their military and Russia's negative viewpoint towards this. NATO believes that their role in Eastern Europe is justified through their right to collective action against any aggressor and it being a method of self defense after Russia's actions.

However, Russia believes that NATO supplying arms to Ukraine and increasing military presence around borders surrounding Eastern Europe is a modern day rendition of the cold war: A primarily US army attempting to push back Soviet influence under the pretense of self determination and sovereignty of countries, when in actuality it is the USA themselves pushing back Russian influence using an international organization to justify their interference.

The agenda at hand does not only concern the parties mentioned above but also Eastern European nations like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland who all have histories of being occupied by the Soviet Union. In this context, NATO should be able to provide arms in order to protect the self-determination of these countries and act as a security umbrella against Russian imperialism. But this also creates a major security dilemma by creating tensions between the allies of Russia, like China, and the NATO Alliance.

Secondly, though in some cases, NATO's presence does more harm than good. A few notable cases are Moldova and Georgia, which both harbor huge Russian-backed separatists movements like Transnistria and South Ossetia. When NATO's military presence near or in these countries increases, so does regional instability. Moscow not condemning these harsh separatist movements further increases instability which is a key loophole to be addressed in this agenda.

In the height of conflicts like these, NATO's credibility is also put under the microscope. Article 5 of collective defense in the face of aggression should be upheld, and if not, NATO's position as an organization and their unity, effectiveness and commitment would all be questioned, which is why some sort of action by NATO is a non negotiable in this context.





BACKGROUND 1

Considering the economy of countries like Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania who are all heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies and critical energy routes and pipelines, NATO interference and aggravating Russia could cause Russia to use its weapons and influence as a weapon considering the economic reliance of these countries on Russia. However, NATO could mitigate such consequences by not using military power to attempt to scare Russia away, but use sanctions or encourage such members to diversify their energy supplies and provide alternatives to reduce dependency rather than resorting to methods which would provoke Russia and harm Europe.

In this modern day and age, cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns and economic pressure are classified as 'hybrid war strategies'. What's tricky about such strategies is that it cannot be met with direct military intervention from NATO as it would be seen as provocative, but addressing such hybrid threats like the ones mentioned above and more, are key to maintain internal stability and protect regions, a key example being the Baltic states.

Though the main conflict surrounds Ukraine and their sovereignty right now, other countries like Georgia and Finland do seek closer ties with NATO, but if these aspirations are still being viewed as provocative by Russia, a repeat of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is in the foreseeable future. Balancing such relationships ensures that NATO remains a credible partner for countries seeking help in establishing themselves without NATO's expansionist tendencies antagonizing Russia.

Avoiding and mitigating conflict is key as countries like Poland and Romania are facing the ripples of the Russia-Ukraine conflict along with Ukraine due to the widespread displacement which is deepening the humanitarian crisis and burdening neighbouring countries with them already hosting millions of refugees. NATO and Russia need to address this issue as it's essential for safeguarding and avoiding a humanitarian crisis.

An area where both NATO and Russia are lacking is through dialogue. NATO's hardline stance against Russia and their antagonizing view of Eastern Europe has made it hard to create diplomatic resolution which balances the wants and needs of both sides. Though NATO has had previous cooperation efforts with Russia, like the NATO-Russia council, these efforts have been deemed redundant due to the recent conflict, though it is needed to find pathways to peaceful coexistence.





BACKGROUND 1

Overall, While NATO's actions aim to secure sovereignty and deter aggression, they also risk escalating tensions with Russia and deepening divides. Addressing this requires a strategic balance where protection does not tip into provocation and where diplomacy remains a pathway

TIMELINE 1

Date	Event
1949	Foreign Ministers from 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington DC, these countries included: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States
1994	Ukraine joins NATO's partnership for peace programme
1997	The NATO-Russia founding act is signed
1999	Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, all former Soviet Union countries, officially join NATO which spikes tensions between NATO and Russia despite the earlier NATO-Russia founding act



TIMELINE 1

Date	Event
2002	Ukraine-NATO action plan was created and Ukraine also entered NATO's intensified dialogue programme NATO-Russia Council was established in order to facilitate dialogue between NATO and Russia in light of security issues
2004	NATO's largest expansion takes place with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
2008	The Russo-Georgian war highlighted Russia's willingness to use military force against former soviet states in light of wanting to expand its sphere of influence which raised alarms with NATO
2014	Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, marking the beginning of Russian aggression towards Ukraine. NATO suspends all practical cooperation with Russia as seen in the previous years like the NATO-Russia Council as it violated international law
2016	During the Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders agree to establish a forward presence in Eastern Europe by deploying multinational battalion sized battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland
2017-2021	As Russian activities continued in the black sea and Russia showed continued aggression towards Ukraine, NATO continued to increase naval and military presence and began putting forces on standby in January and February in response to the buildup of troops near Ukrainian border



TIMELINE 1

Date	Event
2022	<p>Russia's second invasion of Ukraine takes place and NATO takes a firm stance against this by escalating military presence in Eastern Europe in the Baltic and Black sea regions.</p> <p>The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution deploring Russia's aggression against Ukraine, with 141 countries voting in favor</p> <p>NATO increased its military readiness and deployed 4 additional multinational battlegroups in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia in response to Russia's full scale invasion on February 24th that year</p>
2023	<p>Finland gets NATO membership, becoming the 31st member in NATO</p>



KEY PARTIES 1

United States of America

As mentioned, the United States makes up 2/3rds of NATO's defence expenditure of the Alliance as a whole, leading NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence programme through multinational battalions and is NATO's largest and most influential member. Through its influence, it spearheads sanctions on Russia and coordinates NATO's collective defense strategy. For example, the US provided Ukraine with advanced military equipment like HIMARS rocket systems and enforced economic sanctions to try and isolate Russia. Similar to the cold war, the USA views battling Russia's aggression as battling authoritarianism. Additionally, the USA also attempts to contain communist influence in Eastern Europe as a whole, like in China by containing their influence under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It can be argued that without the influence of the USA in NATO, article 5 of collective defense would be hard to uphold as they are the driver for military defense, which makes their position criticized in the context of Eastern Europe.

China

Though China has publicly taken a neutral stance on all matters concerning NATO, they do hold a position of power when it comes to their economic and diplomatic role in the Eastern European region through its various initiatives like the 17+1 initiative or the Belt and Road initiative, targeting Eastern European countries with infrastructure and investment projects. Through this, it avoids direct confrontation with NATO but strategically partners with Russia's anti NATO expansionist policies, criticizing it and weakening NATO unity by roping in individual Eastern European countries and fostering an economy in such countries wherein they have economic dependency on China, limiting NATO influence.

Russia

Russia views NATO as a direct threat to its sphere of influence and believes that NATO unnecessarily antagonizes them. Russia responds to NATO increasing their military presence around their borders by using hybrid warfare through cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns across Eastern Europe and conducts military exercises near NATO borders. Their interests are to prevent further NATO expansion and reassert their influence over former Soviet territories.



KEY PARTIES 1

Russia also does not believe NATO is credible and undermines their 'cohesion' by exploiting political divisions within the alliance like how some members of the alliance overreact towards certain threats, like Poland and the Baltic States who demand more military intervention whilst others are 'soft' on defense, like Germany and France who generally prioritize diplomatic engagement with Russia to avoid further conflict. Russia also supports separatist movements prevalent in countries like Eastern Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

Ukraine

Ukraine plays a pivotal role in Eastern European security as a partner closely aligned with NATO's goals. Through its partnerships with NATO, Ukraine receives military training, advanced equipment like tanks and HIMARS systems and intelligence support to counter Russia's aggression. Ukraine views NATO membership as critical to securing its sovereignty. Ukraine frames its battle against Russia as a fight for democracy and sovereignty against authoritarianism. Additionally, Ukraine combats hybrid warfare through its own cyber defenses while working to limit Russian influence over separatist regions such as Donetsk and Luhansk, which remain focal points of the ongoing conflict.

Poland

Poland is one of NATO's most active members in the Eastern European region and plays a key role in hosting U.S. and NATO troops under the Enhanced Forward Presence program and has welcomed advanced military systems, such as the Aegis Ashore missile defense system. Poland views countering Russia's aggression as a priority, framing its stance as a defense of freedom and sovereignty in Europe. Poland also serves as a hub for supplying Ukraine with arms and aid. However, Poland's position sometimes clashes with other NATO members, such as Germany and France, who advocate for more diplomatic engagement with Russia to avoid escalation. Poland's nationalist government also occasionally creates friction within NATO and the EU, particularly over rule-of-law issues, but its strategic location and proactive role in defense remain critical for NATO's Eastern European policies.



KEY PARTIES 1

Baltic States

The Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are NATO's most vulnerable members, since they share borders with Russia, which they perceive as direct threats to their sovereignty. The Baltic States host NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence battalions, comprising multinational forces stationed to deter Russian aggression, and have invested heavily in their own defense capabilities, often exceeding NATO's 2% GDP guideline for defense spending. These nations view their security through the lens of deterrence against authoritarian expansionism. Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatist movements in Ukraine have reinforced the Baltic States' calls for a stronger NATO presence, including air defense systems and increased troop deployments. However, their calls for greater militarization sometimes create tension within NATO since Western European nations like Germany and France prioritize diplomacy to avoid escalation. The Baltic States also actively combat Russian disinformation and cyberattacks, further underlining their role as frontline states in NATO's Eastern European strategy.

QARMAS = QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

QARMAS 1

- To what extent should Russia's expansionist tendencies be accounted for as aggressive?
- How can NATO uphold article 5 while also accounting the needs of countries like Moldova and Georgia who are backed with Russian Separatist movements?
- How can NATO reduce their military influence in light of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in order to reduce Russian aggression and mitigate the heightened conflict?
- What strategies can NATO adopt to provide security for Eastern European allies without compromising the goal of regional peace?





QARMAS 1

- How can NATO reconcile the aspirations of non-member nations like Georgia and Finland with Russia's red-line concerns regarding NATO expansion?
- What role should humanitarian problems, such as the displacement of refugees, play in shaping NATO's policies in Eastern Europe?
- Should NATO explore non-military alternatives, such as sanctions or diplomatic negotiations, to address security threats in Eastern Europe?
- What role should international law play in determining the legitimacy of NATO's actions in Eastern Europe?
- Should NATO reevaluate its expansion policies in light of ongoing tensions with Russia, and if so, what criteria should be established for new memberships?
- How can NATO contribute to regional stability without triggering further divide between Eastern Europe and Russia's allies, such as China and Belarus?
- Is NATO's interference in the Russia-Ukraine conflict destabilizing peace efforts or enhancing diplomatic discussions?



AGENDA 2

The agenda of "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Technology to Non-State Actors" addresses a growing and multifaceted threat to global peace and security. In an increasingly interconnected world, the accessibility of nuclear technology and materials has become a pressing concern. While state actors have historically been the primary focus of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, the rise of non-state actors, including terrorist organizations and transnational criminal networks, has introduced new dimensions to this challenge. These entities, unbound by international norms and treaties, have the potential to misuse nuclear technology for devastating consequences, including acts of terrorism, economic disruption, and geopolitical destabilization.

Nuclear technology, when utilized responsibly, has vast potential to drive human development. It supports advancements in medical research, energy production, and scientific innovation. However, its dual-use nature—serving both civilian and military purposes—makes it inherently vulnerable to exploitation. Non-state actors, unlike sovereign states, operate outside the constraints of international law. This makes it exceedingly difficult to hold them accountable or to predict their actions. The prospect of such actors acquiring nuclear technology or materials amplifies the risks of nuclear terrorism and necessitates a re-evaluation of existing frameworks for non-proliferation.

The proliferation threat is exacerbated by several factors, including weak governance in certain regions, insufficient security at nuclear facilities, and the availability of nuclear materials on black markets. Globalization and technological advancements have further complicated the situation. Information on nuclear technology is increasingly accessible through digital platforms, while cyber threats pose significant risks to the security of nuclear facilities and supply chains. These factors create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by non-state actors, heightening the urgency for comprehensive international action.

The agenda also underscores the evolving nature of warfare and security threats in the modern era. Traditional deterrence strategies that work against state actors are often ineffective against non-state entities. Unlike states, which may be deterred by the threat of retaliation or sanctions, non-state actors may lack fixed assets or constituencies, making them less susceptible to traditional means of coercion. This shift necessitates innovative strategies and frameworks tailored to address the unique challenges posed by non-state actors



AGENDA 2

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology to non-state actors involves addressing a complex web of issues. These include securing existing stockpiles of nuclear materials, enhancing the implementation and enforcement of international treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and improving global collaboration through institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additionally, the agenda highlights the need to tackle emerging challenges, such as the role of artificial intelligence and cybersecurity in nuclear security. While these technologies offer opportunities to enhance safeguards and monitoring, they also introduce new vulnerabilities that must be carefully managed.

The international community has recognized the gravity of this issue and has taken steps to mitigate the risks. Initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) reflect collective efforts to prevent the misuse of nuclear technology. However, significant gaps remain, particularly in addressing the motivations and capabilities of non-state actors. Bridging these gaps requires a holistic approach that combines stringent regulatory measures, capacity building in vulnerable regions, and the fostering of a global culture of nuclear security.

Ultimately, the agenda is not just about preventing catastrophic events but also about preserving the benefits of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Striking this balance is a complex but necessary endeavor. By addressing the root causes and enabling factors of proliferation, the international community can work towards a safer and more secure world. This requires sustained commitment, innovation, and collaboration across all levels of governance, from local to global. Through these efforts, the agenda seeks to ensure that nuclear technology remains a force for good, rather than a weapon of destruction.





BACKGROUND 2

Nuclear technology's dual-use nature—its ability to serve both civilian and military purposes—has always been a critical challenge in global security. The devastation caused by the first use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II underscored the destructive potential of this technology. This marked the beginning of an era dominated by the nuclear arms race and the subsequent establishment of international frameworks to regulate its proliferation.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), established in 1968, is a cornerstone of global efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. Its objectives are threefold: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and foster disarmament. While the NPT has been largely successful in restricting the number of nuclear-armed states, it does not adequately address the threats posed by non-state actors. Non-state actors—unbound by treaties and international norms—are often more elusive and harder to deter through traditional mechanisms.

The post-Cold War era saw heightened concerns about the security of nuclear materials. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s raised alarms about "loose nukes"—unsecured nuclear weapons and materials left vulnerable to theft or misuse. Several instances have highlighted the fragility of global nuclear security. For example, the black-market network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan in the early 2000s demonstrated how easily nuclear technology and knowledge could be disseminated.

The events of September 11, 2001, marked a turning point in understanding the ambitions of non-state actors like Al-Qaeda, which sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Although the technical barriers to developing a nuclear weapon are significant, the risk of non-state actors constructing a "dirty bomb" remains a serious threat. Dirty bombs, which use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material, could cause mass panic and economic disruption even without the large-scale destruction of a nuclear explosion.



BACKGROUND 2

Today, advancements in technology and the globalization of supply chains have further complicated the non-proliferation landscape. The accessibility of information through the internet, combined with the rise of cyber warfare, creates new vulnerabilities. For instance, cyberattacks on nuclear facilities or supply chains could allow non-state actors to gain access to sensitive materials or disrupt safeguards. The challenge is exacerbated by weak governance in conflict-prone regions, where state institutions lack the capacity to secure nuclear materials effectively.

In addition, the role of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, presents both opportunities and risks. While these technologies can enhance the detection of illicit nuclear activities and improve the monitoring of supply chains, they can also be exploited by non-state actors to bypass security measures or conduct sophisticated cyberattacks.

Looking at the DPRK and their recent activity as of 2023, they have violated UNSC resolutions by continuing to spearhead through their nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes, despite the Secretary-General strongly condemning them. As the representative of the USA in the UNSC put it : “Pyongyang should focus less on stocking an arsenal and more on stocking the pantries of the DPRK people who suffer from severe economic hardship and malnutrition”.

Using the DPRK, we can see how countries which overpower others in terms of nuclear power can threaten global peace and security, in the case that there are no strong safeguarding rules put, not only into place, but also into action. As of January 2024, North Korea is estimated to have assembled approximately 50 nuclear warheads, fissile material for 70-90 nuclear weapons and 60-80 kg of plutonium. Though there has been UNSC resolutions, IAEA inspections and Bilateral negotiations, all these efforts have been highly unsuccessful in halting the DPRK's vigorous nuclear ambitions.



BACKGROUND 2

Addressing these challenges requires robust international cooperation, the strengthening of existing treaties and mechanisms, and the development of innovative solutions to emerging threats. Global efforts must focus on enhancing transparency, ensuring accountability, and building the capacity of states to secure nuclear materials and technologies. Only through a united and comprehensive approach can the international community prevent the catastrophic consequences of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors.

Past UN Actions

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

This resolution obliges all states to refrain from supporting non-state actors in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear weapons, and to establish domestic controls. Though this was partially successful in terms of increasing awareness and improving national legislations in many countries, the implementation of certain aspects of the resolution remains incomplete.

UNODA (UN office for Disarmament Affairs)

UNODA acts in unison with the UNSC and played a crucial role in implementing resolution 1540 through providing technical assistance to member states, organizing regional workshops and training programmes and acting as a facilitator for information sharing between said member states. However, like the 1540 resolution, its results have been incomplete and incomplete.

IAEA (International Atomic Energy agency) Nuclear Security Plan

The IAEA's nuclear security plan involves more comprehensive solutions towards battling nuclear proliferation, such as peer review systems for member states, an incident and trafficking database to track nuclear and radioactive materials and nuclear security guidance documents and training programmes. These efforts have significantly enhanced global nuclear security.





TIMELINE 2

Date	Event
1945	The United States deploys nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, marking the first use of nuclear technology for military purposes
1949	The Soviet Union conducts its first nuclear test, leading to the nuclear arms race
1957	The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is established to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and prevent its military use.
1968	The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is signed, aiming to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technology
1991	The dissolution of the Soviet Union raises concerns about "loose nukes" and unsecured nuclear materials.
2001	Following the 9/11 attacks, evidence emerges of Al-Qaeda's interest in acquiring nuclear weapons
2004	The discovery of Abdul Qadeer Khan's black-market network highlights vulnerabilities in the global non-proliferation system
2011	Concerns rise over the security of nuclear materials in conflict zones, particularly in unstable regions like Libya and Syria.



TIMELINE 2

Date	Event
2018	Advances in cyber warfare and AI spark debates about new risks to nuclear security.
2022	On September 9, 2022, North Korea passed a law to declare itself a nuclear weapons state and rejected any possibility of denuclearisation.

KEY PARTIES 2

United States

As a nuclear power and a founding member of the NPT, the United States has been at the forefront of efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. The U.S. works closely with allies and international organizations to secure nuclear materials worldwide through programs like the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) initiative

Russia

Russia's vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials make it a key player in non-proliferation efforts. Collaboration with the U.S. on securing Soviet-era nuclear materials, such as through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, has been critical

China

As a nuclear-armed state, China has shown increasing commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear technology, particularly in regions like East Asia. It actively participates in international frameworks like the NPT and supports UN sanctions against non-state actors involved in proliferation



KEY PARTIES 2

26

European Union (EU)

The EU plays a significant role in promoting nuclear non-proliferation through diplomatic efforts, funding initiatives for nuclear security, and ensuring compliance with export controls on dual-use technologies

Pakistan

As the home of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network, Pakistan's history highlights the dangers of weak regulatory oversight. However, it has since taken steps to improve its nuclear security framework, including collaborating with the IAEA.

India

Although not an NPT signatory, India's responsible nuclear behavior and adherence to strict export controls make it a valuable partner in non-proliferation efforts. Its engagement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the IAEA underscores its commitment.

North Korea and Iran

These states are often viewed as potential sources of nuclear technology for non-state actors. International efforts to curb their nuclear programs, including sanctions and diplomatic negotiations, remain vital.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The IAEA monitors compliance with nuclear safeguards, ensures the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and provides technical assistance to member states.

Non-Nuclear States

These states must adhere to strict safeguards under the NPT and collaborate with international organizations to prevent diversion of nuclear materials

Private Sector and NGOs

Companies involved in the nuclear supply chain and NGOs like the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) are critical in addressing gaps in nuclear security and advocating for stronger global measures.





QARMAS 2

- What measures can be implemented to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to address the threat posed by non-state actors?
- How can international collaboration be improved to monitor and secure existing stockpiles of nuclear materials and technology?
- What role should the private sector play in preventing the theft or diversion of nuclear materials during production or transportation?
- How can technological advancements such as AI and cybersecurity be utilized to combat nuclear proliferation?
- What frameworks can be established to address the black market trade of nuclear materials and technology?
- How can states with weak governance or ongoing conflict be supported in securing their nuclear facilities and materials?
- What punitive measures should be enforced against state or non-state actors found to be aiding nuclear proliferation?
- How can global awareness and education on the risks of nuclear proliferation be enhanced?

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